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NO PUBLIC BENEFITS FOR PUBLIC 
BENEFIT: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
NARROW APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT 
REGISTRATION 
Abstract: In the 2017 case Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation v. Wall-
Street.com, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held 
that before a plaintiff can bring a claim for copyright infringement under the 
1976 Copyright Act, the United States Copyright Office (“Copyright Office”) 
must officially review the work submitted for registration, and the Register of 
Copyrights (“the Register”) must accept or refuse to register it. This ruling 
echoed the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s similar find-
ing in 2005 in La Resolana Architects, PA, v. Clay Realtors. In contrast, in 
2004 and 2010, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits, respectively, held that a plaintiff may commence suit upon filing an 
application for copyright with the Copyright Office and is not required to wait 
for approval or refusal from the Register. This Comment argues that the Elev-
enth Circuit is incorrect in its interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act. The 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits found, incorrectly, that the statute contained plain 
language that unambiguously supported a complete registration approach. 
Further, this Comment argues that the statute upon which these holdings rely 
is ambiguous, and where the absence of plain, unambiguous language sup-
ports either approach, public policy and congressional intent are best served 
by a pro-application approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the United States moved into the last quarter of the twentieth centu-
ry, the development of technologies like television, radio, sound recordings, 
and film necessitated updating a copyright code that had not been revised 
since 1909.1 Consequently, in 1976, Congress passed the Copyright Act 
(“the Act”), amending Title 17 of the United States Code.2 Among the 
amendments was 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), which updated common law proce-
dures for bringing a civil action for copyright infringement.3 Under both the 
original 1909 Copyright Act and the 1976 Act, potential litigants must, as a 
precondition to filing suit, register their copyright with the United States 
                                                                                                                           
 1 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660. 
 2 See id. The 1976 Copyright Act ensures copyright protection for all published and un-
published work, regardless of whether the copyright has not yet been formally registered. See 
Copyright Act of 1976 § 408(a), 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012). 
 3 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 157, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5773 (clarify-
ing that a claimant must still attempt registration of copyright to bring suit for infringement, but 
providing remedies if registration is refused). 
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Copyright Office (“Copyright Office”).4 The addition of § 411(a), allows 
claimants to bring a copyright suit regardless of whether the Register of 
Copyrights (“the Register”) deems the subject matter copyrightable and is-
sues a certificate of registration, so long as the other requirements of § 
411(a) are met.5 
Within the language of this statute lies a latent problem of construc-
tion: the text of § 411(a) begins, “[N]o civil action for infringement . . . 
shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been 
made . . . .”6 If the Copyright Office refuses to issue a certificate, § 411(a) 
continues, “In any case . . . where the deposit, application, and fee required 
for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office . . . and regis-
tration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action 
for infringement . . . .”7 
Section 411(a)’s fluid use of the word “registration” has created ten-
sion in the courts, as the statute can be construed to refer simultaneously to 
the entire act of registration (“registration of the copyright claim”), and to 
the single act of filing with the Copyright Office (“if registration has been 
refused”).8 This potentially fluid language has created contention over 
                                                                                                                           
 4 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (requiring registration as a precondition to suit under the 1976 Copyright 
Act); Copyright Act of 1909 § 13 (repealed 1976). See, e.g., Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre 
Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640–41 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that the text of 
Title 17 plainly requires that a copyright be registered in compliance with all the provisions of the 
title before the copyright owner can commence an infringement suit). Formal registration as a 
precondition to suit already existed under the 1909 Copyright Act, and it was left intact to incen-
tivize creators to register their copyrights. Copyright Act of 1909 § 12 (repealed 1976); see H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 158, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5774 (noting that because 
copyright protection is now automatic, Congress must offer incentives such as the ability to file 
suit to encourage registration). The Copyright Office must examine and formally register works 
because works not of sufficient originality of thought are not copyrightable and thus not protected 
by copyright law. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–59 (1884) (es-
tablishing originality as the benchmark for copyright under the U.S. Constitution). 
 5 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). Under prior common law, if the Office refused to issue a certificate of 
registration because the material was not copyrightable, applicants seeking registration could not 
proceed with suit until they filed an action against the Register to compel issuance of a certificate. 
See Vacheron, 260 F.2d at 640–41. 
 6 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The statute reads, “[N]o civil action for infringement . . . . shall be insti-
tuted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made . . . .” Id. (empha-
sis added). “Preregistration” is a procedure whereby a copyright holder may preregister a work 
prior to commercial publication, if the class of works to which it belongs has a history of in-
fringement occurring immediately upon publication, such as commercial music. Id. at § 408(f). 
See, e.g., Marino v. Usher, 673 F. App’x. 125, 130 (3d Cir. 2016) (involving musical composi-
tions preregistered with the Copyright Office in anticipation of wide release but before official 
publication). 
 7 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (emphasis added). The Register can then join the suit and challenge the 
copyrightability of the claim, but failure to join the suit does not deprive the court of jurisdiction 
to determine that issue. Id.; see Reed Elsevier v. Muchnik, 559 U.S. 154, 169 (2010) (finding that 
registration is not a jurisdictional element that bars a court from hearing a claim). 
 8 Compare Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(finding that a court cannot hear a copyright claim until the Copyright Office has examined and 
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whether the statute’s language is plain or ambiguous, and thus whether a 
suit may be commenced when the rights holder files his application for reg-
istration, or when the Copyright Office reviews and either accepts and reg-
isters the copyright, or rejects the application.9 The temporal distance be-
tween application and final registration is not negligible—the Copyright 
Office has experienced serious delays when approving or refusing registra-
tion as a result of administrative issues such as regulatory changes.10 Be-
cause the Copyright Office may reject any material it deems not copyright-
able, mere application is not a rubber stamp process and does not necessari-
ly result in complete registration of a copyright.11 
As a result of Congress’s chosen language in § 411(a), Federal Circuit 
Courts of Appeals are split over when a plaintiff may file suit: upon review, 
or upon application.12 The most recent division comes from the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, where the court in Fourth Estate Public 
Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com (“Fourth Estate II”) held that Congress’ 
use of the term “registration” in the 1976 Act refers to the complete process 
of application and review.13 
This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly decided 
that the Copyright Act’s language is unambiguous and, as a result of con-
cluding their analysis at statutory language, failed to adequately consider 
policy ramifications of their decision.14 Part I of this Comment details the 
history of the circuit split leading to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.15 Part 
II analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning for finding in favor of the com-
plete registration approach, including its heavy reliance upon the U.S. Cir-
                                                                                                                           
then either approved or rejected the application), and Haan Crafts Corp. v. Craft Masters, Inc., 683 
F. Supp. 1234, 1242 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff cannot file suit for copyright in-
fringement until the copyright is registered), with Positive Black Talk v. Cash Money Records, 
Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that, although other federal circuits hold different-
ly, in the Fifth Circuit, the only requirement for an infringement action is that the Copyright Office 
receive the application, deposit, and fee), and Iconbazaar L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 
F. Supp. 2d 630, 634 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (finding that a claim will survive a motion to dismiss if a 
completed application has been filed). 
 9 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 10 See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The plain-
tiff filed his application for copyright in 1985, but because the Copyright Office had issued an 
administrative delay in evaluating works displayed on a computer screen, the Copyright Office did 
not issue a final decision until late 1988. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(C)–(D) (2016) (issuing new and 
specific instructions for presentation of audiovisual works and automatic databases to the Copy-
right Office during application); Kregos, 795 F. Supp. at 1328. 
 11 See, e.g., Kregos, 795 F. Supp. at 1328. Despite this delay, the plaintiff’s copyright was 
ultimately rejected by the Copyright Office. Id. Rejection of a copyright is not a bar to suit, so 
long as the Register is notified. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). Section 411(a) permits a claimant to bring suit 
even if the copyright was refused. Id. 
 12 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 13 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 14 See infra notes 18–90 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes19–39and accompanying text. 
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cuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s pro-complete registration ra-
tionale.16 Part III argues that the Eleventh Circuit erred in this reliance, and 
should have instead considered that the construction of the statute is ambig-
uous, that Congress’s intent to formalize copyright is equally served by the 
application approach, and that the benefits of the registration approach are 
wholly outweighed by its drawbacks.17 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SPLIT: POSITIVE BLACK TALK, LA RESOLANA, 
COSMETIC IDEAS, AND FOURTH ESTATE II 
This Part will first discuss the groundwork for the split among Federal 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, describing the development of federal doctrine 
through decisions and dicta.18 The split began in 2004 when the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Positive Black Talk, 
Inc., v. Cash Money Records, Inc.19 This decision was the first circuit opin-
ion to turn on the timing of registration.20 The Fifth Circuit held without 
elaboration that the United States Copyright Office (“Copyright Office”) 
need only receive the application, deposit, and fee before a plaintiff may file 
an infringement action.21 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed, creating a 
split among the circuit courts one year later in La Resolana Architects, PA v. 
Clay Realtors Angel Fire.22 The Tenth Circuit did not consider § 411’s lan-
guage particularly ambiguous, instead holding that “registration” for the 
purposes of being eligible to file suit refers to the complete act and is thus 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 40–67and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 68–90 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 19–39 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Positive Black Talk, 394 F.3d at 365 (finding that when hip-hop artist Jerome “Jubilee” 
Temple filed his application for copyright registration the day before filing suit for infringement 
against Terius “Juvenile” Gray, the application was sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdic-
tion). 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. The Fifth Circuit did not discuss its reasoning in detail, instead acknowledging that 
although some federal circuits require the Register to approve and issue a certificate, the Fifth 
Circuit requires only a complete application. Id. Although Positive Black Talk was the first defini-
tive federal circuit opinion, the Fifth Circuit had previously discussed the same pro-application 
approach. See id.; Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984) (al-
lowing standing for a copyright infringement suit when plaintiffs had filed an application but not 
received a registration certificate). 
 22 See La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (finding that registration had not been fulfilled in a copyright infringement dispute 
between an architectural firm and realtor group, consequently barring the plaintiffs from filing 
suit). Before the Tenth Circuit created what is generally regarded as the first point of the circuit 
split, the Eleventh Circuit had actually upheld a pro-registration approach, though its reasoning 
was discussed in brief dicta. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 
1489 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the appropriate point at which the suit could proceed was upon 
receipt of the registration certificate). 
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only satisfied when the Copyright Office examines the application, registers 
it, and issues a certificate of registration.23 The Tenth Circuit buttressed its 
interpretation by drawing comparisons to congruent language from § 410(a) 
and (b), both of which “require affirmative acts” on behalf of the Register 
of Copyrights (“the Register”) to “examine,” “register,” and “issue” certifi-
cate of registration.24 
In 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further widened 
the split with its decision in Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp.25 
The court held that receipt of a complete application by the Copyright Office 
satisfied the Act’s registration requirement because this approach better ful-
filled Congress’s purpose in passing the Act in the first place—specifically its 
desire to reduce, not increase, formality in the registration process.26 Like the 
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit also considered the structural 
context of the statute, but conversely found § 410 to be ambiguous and not 
dispositive of Congress’s intent.27 The Ninth Circuit also held that § 408, 
passed in the same 1976 Act, was supportive of both the registration and ap-
plication approaches.28 To resolve this ambiguity, in addition to analyzing the 
statute itself, the Ninth Circuit relied on broad policy arguments in favor of 
efficiency and protecting litigants against disadvantages that could be caused 
by the delay between application and approval.29 The Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits were the only circuit courts to focus directly on the issue, although 
dicta in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits has concretized the split, as has the 
First and Second Circuits’ refusal to engage the issue.30 
                                                                                                                           
 23 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1200. 
 24 Id. at 1201. Compare Copyright Act of 1976 § 410(a), 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2012) (“When, 
after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material deposited consti-
tutes copyrightable subject matter . . . the Register shall register the claim and issue to the appli-
cant a certificate of registration under the seal of the Copyright Office.”), with id. at § 410(b) (“In 
any case in which the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . the material deposited does not 
constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for any other reason, the Regis-
ter shall refuse registration . . . .”). 
 25 See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010) (find-
ing the registration requirement had been fulfilled in an action by a jewelry designer for copyright 
infringement against a competitor). 
 26 See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 621 (holding that application is a more practical approach 
than registration, which only serves to add an extraneous level of formality to registering a copy-
right); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 158 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5774 (explaining the importance of copyright registration for the public at large, and emphasizing 
that any inducements to register should be practical). 
 27 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. 
 28 Id. at 617; see 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of 
the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office . . . the application . . . .”). 
 29 See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 619–20 (analyzing negative ramifications of the registra-
tion approach and Congressional intent in passing the 1976 Copyright Act). 
 30 See Alicea v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773, 779 (1st Cir. 2014); Psihoyos v. John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2014); Brooks-Ngwenya v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch., 564 
F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2009); Action Tapes, Inc. v. Mattson, 462 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006) 
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In the wake of this split, Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation, a 
news corporation that generates and syndicates online-only journalism on a 
subscription model, filed suit in the Southern District of Florida for copy-
right infringement in 2016.31 Fourth Estate licensed syndicated news stories 
to the defendant, Wall-Street.com, with the condition that any cancellation 
of Wall-Street’s subscription with Fourth Estate also terminated the license 
to host Fourth Estate’s stories.32 When Wall-Street cancelled its subscrip-
tion, its refusal to remove the hosted stories allegedly constituted copyright 
infringement.33 
At the time of the alleged infringement, Fourth Estate had not yet reg-
istered their stories with the Copyright Office.34 Knowing that this was a 
bar to suit, but believing that an application to the Copyright Office would 
allow a suit to proceed, Fourth Estate filed an application to register the 
copyrighted articles.35 Wall-Street moved to dismiss, arguing that copy-
rightable works are not registered until the Register has issued a certificate 
of registration, and therefore that Fourth Estate had erroneously brought suit 
over unregistered works.36 The district court agreed, holding that a party 
cannot file suit before obtaining registration for the work, and dismissed the 
suit without prejudice.37 In its ruling, however, the district court did not ad-
dress the distinction between registration by the Copyright Office and ap-
                                                                                                                           
The Seventh Circuit’s dicta conflicts with itself, holding both for and against the application ap-
proach. Compare Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding 
without expansion that a plaintiff must file an application for registration before suit can be filed), 
with Brooks-Ngwenya, 564 F.3d at 806 (declining both to state the circuit’s position and cite the 
previous case when discussing the circuit split). The Eighth Circuit has not analyzed the issue but 
has arguably taken a position in favor of application. See, e.g., Action Tapes, Inc., 462 F.3d at 
1013 (stating briefly that until the owner has filed the entire application, deposit, and registration 
fee, the owner cannot file suit). Both the First and Second Circuits have acknowledged the circuit 
split but have declined to decide whether to adopt the application approach or the registration 
approach. See Alicea, 744 F.3d at 779 (acknowledging the split but declining to decide either way 
because under either approach the defendants were entitled to summary judgment); Psihoyos, 748 
F.3d at 125 (declining to decide the issue because the plaintiff had not filed an application in the 
instant controversy). 
 31 Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com (Fourth Estate II), 856 F.3d 1338, 
1339 (11th Cir. 2017); Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com (Fourth Estate I), No. 
16–60497, 2016 WL 9045625, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2016). 
 32 Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1339. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Brief for Appellant at 14, Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d 1338 (No. 16–13726) (admitting 
that after discovering the infringement, Fourth Estate filed its application with the Copyright Of-
fice). 
 35 See id. at 20 (recognizing as Appellant that the Eleventh Circuit had thus far not ruled in 
favor of the application approach, but nevertheless asserting in its brief that it had pled in compli-
ance with § 411(a)). 
 36 See generally Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Fourth Estate I, No. 16–60497, 2016 WL 
9045625 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (filing the motion because on the face of the complaint, under the regis-
tration approach, Fourth Estate had not registered its copyright and thus could not state a claim). 
 37 See Fourth Estate I, 2016 WL 9045625, at *1. 
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plication by the copyright holder, assuming without analysis that “registra-
tion” refers to the approval and registration of the copyright by the Copy-
right Office.38 Unhappy with dismissal and confident that they satisfied the 
registration requirement, Fourth Estate appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.39 
II. SHORT, BUT SWEET: A COMPARISON OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S 
STATUTORY AND POLICY ANALYSES 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Fourth 
Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com (“Fourth Estate II”) is short, a 
concise four pages of statutory interpretation wherein the court affirmed its 
adoption of the registration approach, and consequently also affirmed the dis-
trict court’s dismissal.40 Part A of this Section will compare the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s opinion with the Federal Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s simi-
lar but more robust analysis supporting registration occurring at the point of 
approval or rejection by the Copyright Register (“pro-registration”).41 Part B 
will contrast both opinions with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s opposing holding in favor of registration occurring at the point of appli-
cation (“pro-application”).42 
A. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuit’s Pro-Registration Approach 
While the source of the conflict between circuit courts is a disagree-
ment over whether § 411(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act (“the Act”) requires 
complete approval or refusal of registration versus filing an application, the 
Eleventh Circuit looked to and relied upon surrounding provisions to clarify 
congressional intent.43 The language of § 410(a) states plainly that the Reg-
ister of Copyrights (“the Register”) first examines the copyright application 
to determine if the submitted material qualifies as a copyrightable work, and 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See id. Although the district judge’s opinion was short and did not elaborate on his reason-
ing, the judge drew from the registration approach adopted in dicta in M.G.B. Homes. See id. at 
*2; 903 F.2d at 1489 (holding that a plaintiff cannot file suit for copyright infringement unless he 
or she “has a registered copyright”) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit later explicitly af-
firmed in dicta that it had ratified the registration approach when it authored M.G.B. Homes. See 
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1302 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 39 See Brief for Appellant at 14, Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1338 (No. 16–13726) (appeal-
ing to the Eleventh Circuit and arguing that “registration” in § 411(a) refers to filing an application 
with the Register). 
 40 See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com (Fourth Estate II), 856 F.3d 1338, 
1339 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 41 See infra notes 43–54 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 55–67and accompanying text. 
 43 See Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1341. In total, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed §§ 411(a), 
410(a), 410(b), and 410(d) and found that each supported the registration approach such that no 
further analysis of legislative history or policy was necessary. See id. at 1341–42. The court 
acknowledged § 408(a) but ultimately concluded that it pertained only to the requirements of ob-
taining copyright registration and was not relevant to timing. Id. 
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upon such a positive finding, the Register then registers the copyright and 
issues a certificate of registration.44 The enumeration of this timeline was 
key in the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis: the court held that because the stat-
utes requires examination prior to registration, registration necessarily can-
not be fulfilled without examination, and therefore the application approach 
is invalid.45 The subsequent section of the Act, § 410(b), further allows the 
Register to “refuse registration” if the material is deemed invalid or uncopy-
rightable.46 Section 410(d) contains similar “later-in-time-than” language, 
which the court found implied that the Register’s positive examination is a 
requirement for registration.47 In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, had Congress 
intended “registration” to be defined as the act of filing an application, there 
would be no statutory language allowing the Register to refuse registration 
after the point of application.48 
The Eleventh Circuit also discussed § 408(a), which pertains to the 
procedure for obtaining copyright registration in general.49 The court reject-
ed Fourth Estate’s argument that because § 408(a) refers to obtaining regis-
tration by submitting an application, and does not refer to issuance of a cer-
tificate, “registration” therefore is the act of submitting an application to the 
Register.50 The court instead held this section speaks only to the procedures 
that must be followed, including filling application materials, to receive 
copyright registration.51 
This analysis closely follows that of the Tenth Circuit: like its succes-
sor, the Tenth Circuit in La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel 
Fire framed its interpretation of § 411 through the lens of § 410.52 The court 
found that § 410’s plain language, which allows the Register to “refuse reg-
istration” should the material not be copyrightable, clearly creates a linear 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Copyright Act of 1976 § 410(a), 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2012). To qualify as a copyrightable 
work subject to copyright protection, a work must be an original work of authorship fixed in a 
tangible medium. Id. at § 102. An original work is one of independent creation that exhibits a 
“modicum of creativity.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
Copyright protection does not extend to products of an author’s labor but without original concep-
tion or contribution by that author. Id. at 349. 
 45 See Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
 4617 U.S.C. § 410(b) (“In any case in which the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . 
the material deposited does not constitute copyrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid 
for any other reason, the Register shall refuse registration . . . .”). 
 47Id. at § 410(d) (stating in relevant part that the Register of Copyrights determines at a later 
date whether a work satisfies basic standards for copyright protection); Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d 
at 1342. 
 48 Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
 49 See id.; 17 U.S.C. 408(a). 
 50 Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1341; see Brief for Appellant at 23, 25, Fourth Estate, 856 
F.3d 1338 (No. 16–13726). 
 51 Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1341. 
 52 Compare Fourth Estate, 856 F.3d at 1341 (analyzing § 410(a)–(d)), with La Resolana Ar-
chitects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005) (turning likewise 
to surrounding language for structural interpretation). 
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endpoint for registration which is not satisfied by mere application and must 
be preceded by examination.53 The Eleventh and Tenth Circuits employ 
comparable analyses, coming to the same conclusion that nothing in either 
statute implies that the act of registration is automatic, or that the act of fil-
ing is sufficient to constitute registration.54 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Pro-Application Approach 
The Ninth Circuit does not view the statutes as favorably.55 In its Cos-
metic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp ruling, the court agreed that 
§ 410(a) and § 411(a) address registration as an act that requires forward 
action by the Copyright Office, but pointed out that other sections of the 
statute muddy any clarity § 411’s text might have provided on its own.56 
For the Ninth Circuit, § 410(d)’s reference to the Register’s ability to 
accept or decline a copyright registration does not override its otherwise 
ambiguous construction.57 The section states that, for the purposes of eligi-
bility to file suit, “the effective date of copyright registration is the day on 
which an application . . . which is later determined by the Register . . . to 
have been acceptable for registration, [has] been received in the Copyright 
Office.”58 The court acknowledged that § 410(d) could be interpreted as 
requiring affirmative action from the Register before registration is com-
                                                                                                                           
 53 See 17 U.S.C. 410(b); La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1201. The Tenth Circuit first holds that the 
statute plainly indicates that the applicant and Copyright Office must undertake a “series of af-
firmative steps” before filing suit. Id. at 1200. Where the Tenth Circuit diverges from the Eleventh 
is in its assertion that § 408 is unambiguous in its inclusion of the Register’s role, and thus unam-
biguous in its pro-registration support. See id. at 1201. Cf. Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1341 (refrain-
ing from characterizing § 408 to contain more than an absence of support for pro-application). Addi-
tionally, although the Tenth Circuit favors the registration approach, the court’s interpretation of 
“registration” differs slightly from the precedent discussed in the opinion. See La Resolana, 416 
F.3d at 1202–03. The district court cases discussed in La Resolana require not only that the copy-
right owner have filed his or her copyright and had the Register examine, approve, and register 
their copyright, but also that the owner must have received the paper certificate of registration 
prior to filing suit. See, e.g., Loree Rodkin Mgmt. Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 
1053, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing the jewelry maker plaintiff’s suit specifically because the 
plaintiff had not yet received a registration certificate from the Office); Strategy Source, Inc. v. 
Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D. D.C. 2002) (finding that absence of a registration certificate is a 
bar to suit under § 410). La Resolana rejected this approach. See 416 F.3d at 1202–03. The lan-
guage of § 410 refers to “register[ing] the claim” and “issu[ing] a certificate” as two distinct acts, 
which the Tenth Circuit considers proof positive that issuance and registration are not one and the 
same. Id. A certificate may be evidence of the validity of a copyright, but in the Tenth Circuit it is 
not a prerequisite to suit. See id. 
 54 Compare Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1341 (analyzing § 410(a)–(d)), with La Resolana, 
416 F.3d at 1201 (likewise turning to surrounding language for structural interpretation). 
 55 See infra notes 56–67. 
 56 See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 617–18 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(discussing § 408(a) and § 410(d)). 
 57 See id. at 618. 
 58 Copyright Act of 1976 § 410(d), 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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plete, which therefore implies that “registration” is the complete process of 
application and examination.59 While the court considered this pro-
registration reading to be plausible, they ultimately held that § 410(d) could 
just as reasonably be read to endorse a pro-application interpretation.60 The 
court reasoned that if an application for copyright registration is the effec-
tive date of registration, as is plainly stated in § 410(d), then the catalyst 
event for registration is the application itself, not examination.61 
The Ninth Circuit considers § 408(a) to be likewise supportive of more 
than one interpretation.62 Although this section concerns copyright registra-
tion in general, it briefly states that a copyright owner “may obtain registra-
tion” by filing an application with the Copyright Office.63 Both Fourth Es-
tate II and La Resolana dismissed this language quickly as unsupportive of 
the application approach.64 The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, considered plau-
sible the possibility that under § 408(a), the sole requirement for obtaining 
registration is to apply for it.65  
                                                                                                                           
 59 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id. Under the back-dating interpretation of § 410(d), the date on which the copyright 
application was submitted to the Office becomes the date when registration officially occurs. See 
17 U.S.C. 410(d); La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1203 
(10th Cir. 2005). Official registration commences the statute of limitations for an infringement 
claim; therefore, the statute of limitations begins at the point of application, regardless of when the 
Copyright Office registers the copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(d); La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1203. 
 62 See 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (“[T]he owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of the copy-
right claim by delivering to the Copyright Office . . . the application . . . .”); see infra notes 57–61. 
 63 17 U.S.C. § 408(a). 
 64 See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com (Fourth Estate II), 856 F.3d 1338, 
1341 (11th Cir. 2017) (dismissing § 408(a) as irrelevant to a construction analysis); La Resolana, 
416 F.3d at 1203 (asserting that § 408(a) directly supports registration as an affirmative act). The 
Eleventh Circuit’s brief discussion of § 408(a) in Fourth Estate II characterizes the section as a 
mere precondition to registration that must be fulfilled. See 856 F.3d at 1341. The Tenth Circuit 
discussed this section in more detail in La Resolana, but ultimately did not consider it a challenge 
to the pro-registration approach. See 416 F.2d at 1201. The court held that the statute’s use of the 
word “may” instead of “shall” indicated that filing an application is only a preliminary step in 
obtaining copyright. See id.; see also Corbis Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 
522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that no part of the statute’s language suggested that registration 
occurred at the point of application). 
 65 See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged La Resolana’s read-
ing of § 408(a), but considered it incomplete. See id. at 617 n.7. A copyright owner “may obtain 
registration” under § 408(a), but this is not necessarily a construction that indicates that further 
review is necessary; rather, the Ninth Circuit considered use of the word “may” to be consistent 
with the broader context of § 408(a). See id. Section 408(a) is entitled “Registration Permissive,” 
and its purpose is to make clear that under this statute, registration is optional and not a prerequi-
site to copyright protection. See id. Prior to the 1976 Act, which added this provision, registration 
of a copyright was mandatory if the owner wanted any copyright protection at all. See H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 143, 146, 150 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5759, 5762, 5766 
(discussing the forfeiture of copyright under the old regime if the owner of a work failed to meet 
certain statutory requirements). The Ninth Circuit held that § 408’s inclusion of the word “may” 
rather than “shall” can be plausibly read to indicate that unlike before, registration is permissive 
under the 1976 Act, rather than mandatory. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617–18 n.7. 
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Having found the statute ambiguous, the court then looked to purpose, 
context, and public policy and consequently found in favor of the application 
approach, determining that it better served the purpose of the 1976 Copyright 
Act.66 There was no such discussion in Fourth Estate II, as the Eleventh Cir-
cuit followed principles of statutory construction and chose to end its inquiry 
when it held that the plain words of the statute were not ambiguous.67 
III. WHY CAN’T WE BE FRIENDS?: SMART POLICY IS NOT IN CONFLICT 
WITH THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 
Copyright protections are best served by the application approach, and 
the split among Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals should resolve according-
ly.68 This Part will argue that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit erred first in holding that § 411(a)’s language is plain and unambig-
uous, and second in dismissing purpose, context, and policy arguments.69 
Because provisions in the 1976 Copyright Act (“the Act”) can be read 
as plausibly in support of either approach, courts can and should analyze 
broader policy concerns and consequences of adopting a registration ap-
proach.70 Foremost, requiring complete registration as a precondition to suit 
creates an unnecessary and potentially harmful delay in litigation.71 A plain-
tiff may ultimately file suit regardless of whether the copyright is approved 
or rejected by the Register of Copyrights (“the Register”), yet during the 
examination period the plaintiff is temporarily left in a legal period of pur-
gatory.72 During this period, despite knowing that a lawsuit will eventually 
be available, the copyright owner has no recourse against continuing harm-
ful infringement.73 Furthermore, the greatest danger of a delay between ap-
plication and registration is that the statute of limitations for a copyright 
infringement suit will run out.74 The Act provides a three-year statute of 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618 (agreeing with the Supreme Court ruling in Robinson 
v. Shell Oil Company, 519 U.S. 337 (1997), finding that in the wake of an ambiguous statute, 
courts look beyond statutory language and consider which interpretation better suits the purpose of 
the statute itself). 
 67 Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1342; see Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 
(2002) (finding that judicial inquiry ends when a statute’s language is unambiguous and its scheme 
consistent and coherent). 
 68 See infra notes71–90and accompanying text.  
 69 See infra notes71–90and accompanying text.  
 70 See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.  
 71 See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325, 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting 
that three-year delay in plaintiff’s registration allowed the alleged infringement to continue un-
checked). 
 72 Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 73 Copyright Act of 1976 § 411(a), 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012). 
 74 See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012); see also, e.g., Kregos, 795 F. Supp. at 1329–30 (resulting in 
plaintiff being barred from suit because of administrative delay in processing his copyright appli-
cation). 
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limitations, which commences at the point of the alleged infringement.75 If 
an applicant has not been approved for registration, yet resides in a pro-
registration jurisdiction, the applicant is barred from suit.76 
While the Eleventh Circuit completely declined to review policy con-
siderations, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit briefly dis-
cussed the possibility of uncertainty during a lawsuit that could result from 
allowing suit to commence before the Register makes a determination on 
the instant work’s copyrightability.77 Should the suit commence with the 
advantageous presumption that the copyright is valid, a contrary determina-
tion by the Register could destabilize copyright litigation proceedings, 
which La Resolana contends is counter to the aims of the 1976 Act.78 Alt-
hough this argument carries some validity, it does not outweigh the harm of 
continuing infringement of a plaintiff’s copyright and, worse, potential ex-
piration of the statute of limitations.79 
Pro-registration arguments also focus heavily on Congress’s intentions 
in passing the Act—specifically their intent to incentivize copyright owners 
to register their copyrights.80 In addition to the ability to file suit, other liti-
giously focused benefits of registration include collecting attorney’s fees 
and statutory damages, as well as—if the Copyright Office accepts the cop-
yright—a prima facie presumption of the copyright’s validity.81 Congress 
                                                                                                                           
 75 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). 
 76 See, e.g., Kregos, 795 F. Supp. at 1329–30 (finding multiple claims barred from suit even 
though the plaintiff could not have filed while still awaiting registration approval). 
 77 La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 
2005); see Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com (Fourth Estate II), 856 F.3d 1338, 
1342 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming and quoting Eleventh Circuit precedent in Villarreal v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 969 (11th Cir. 2016) that reads “judicial inquiry is com-
plete” if there is no ambiguity in the face of a statute). 
 78 La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205. 
 79 See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 620. The Eleventh Circuit disagrees, finding in Fourth 
Estate II that the potential time bar is not a flaw but rather a feature by design—the fear of inabil-
ity to file suit encourages copyright owners to register their copyrights promptly. Fourth Estate II, 
856 F.3d. at 1342. The court contends that this design is evident in other provisions of the Act, 
specifically § 410(c), which grants the registrant’s copyright the privilege of “prima facie pre-
sumption of validity” if the registration was completed within five years of initial publication. 17 
U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012); Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1342. 
 80 See Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1342; La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1206. The Tenth Circuit 
notes in particular that in 1993, Congress considered an amendment to Title 17, which would 
dispose of the registration requirement entirely, yet declined to adopt this amendment. La Resola-
na, 416 F.3d at 1206; see Copyright Reform Act of 1993, H.R. 897, 103d Cong. § 6 (1993). 
 81 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (allowing a registration certificate to constitute prima facie evi-
dence of the copyright’s validity in the event of litigation); id. § 411(a) (granting access to courts 
after registration of copyright); id. § 412 (granting copyright owner the ability to collect attorneys’ 
fees in the event of a judgment in the owner’s favor if the copyright owner registered the copy-
right either within three months of the work’s publication, or before the infringement of the work). 
A registered copyright carries prima facie presumption of validity because the Register has al-
ready examined the work and deemed it copyrightable. Id. § 410(c). This presumption is valuable 
to a plaintiff, who otherwise bears the burden of proving that the central work in an infringement 
146 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
further contemplated other, less tangible benefits, which a copyright owner 
may experience, such as knowing that the government has approved his or 
her labor and creativity.82 Yet these incentives are not zero-sum game piec-
es, applicable only if a circuit court chooses one approach over the other; 
their benefits apply equally to both a holder of a certificate of registration 
and an applicant still awaiting examination, with the only distinction being 
time.83 Copyright owners whose work risks infringement or is already in-
fringed ultimately register their copyrights because the Act incentivizes 
them to do so.84 This registration may be done solely in anticipation of liti-
gation, but nothing in the Act’s drafting suggests that enforcing one’s pro-
tection from copyright infringement is a less legitimate goal than upholding 
formal registration processes as currently required by the Eleventh Circuit.85 
Perhaps the weakest yet most prevalent argument in favor of the regis-
tration approach is that Congress’s consistent tendency toward formality in 
copyright registration necessitates the greatest amount of bureaucracy al-
lowed in the statute before registration can be considered legitimate.86 The 
Tenth Circuit—upon whom the Eleventh Circuit relies in its brief considera-
tion of intent—both overemphasized and mischaracterized this goal.87 The 
                                                                                                                           
action is copyrightable. See id.; see also, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 
908 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[T]he existence of a valid copyright can be established by the introduction 
into evidence of a Copyright Office certificate of registration.”); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DA-
VID NIMMER, M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.11 (1980) (discussing the evidentiary weight of the 
registration certificate). 
 82 S. REP. NO. 100–352, at 19–20 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3724–25. 
 83 See id. (recognizing benefits which, in addition to the impalpable validation of creativity, 
include prima facie presumption of validity in infringement suits, statutory damages and attor-
ney’s fees). 
 84 See, e.g., Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 363 (5th 
Cir. 2004). The plaintiff and defendant recorded songs with the identical lyric, “back that ass up” 
as a major part of each song’s respective hook. Id. Each recording occured in the fall of 1997. Id. 
Desiring to enter into litigation, the plaintiff registered the copyright pursuant to the 1976 Act’s 
requirements on the same day that it filed suit for infringement against the defendant. Id. at 364. 
 85 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 157 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5773. 
In fact, the passage of the 1976 Act can be construed as encouraging leniency in registration and 
relaxation of formal procedures, because Congress extended a genuine cause of action to unregis-
tered copyright holders. See id. The House Report discusses only that although a copyright owner 
who has not registered his claim still enjoys protection, registration is still a prerequisite to enforc-
ing copyright. Id.; see Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612 at 619 (recognizing that Congress’s loosening 
of notice requirements and rejection of mandatory registration was indicative of its intent to relax, 
not reinforce, formality). 
 86 See, e.g., La Resolana, 856 F.3d at 1205–06 (discussing at length the history of copyright 
law and Congress’ tendencies toward formality). H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 152–53, as reprinted 
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5768–69 (detailing meticulous standards for depositing phonographic 
materials for registration). 
 87 See La Resolana, 856 F.3d at 1206. The lynchpin of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis was Con-
gress’ rejection of the proposed Berne Act in 1988. See id. at 1205–06. The Berne Act was a pro-
posed series of amendments to Title 17, which sought to abandon the registration requirement so 
that the United States could ally with international copyright accords (“Berne Convention”) and 
deliberately avoid formality. See id. Congress ultimately rejected this proposal, eliminating the 
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Act did create statutory incentives to register through formal policies, but it 
also eliminated the notice requirement for a valid copyright, granted greater 
flexibility to the Register when accepting different types of materials, and 
most importantly, completely eliminated mandatory registration as a pre-
requisite to copyright protection.88 Because the application approach is 
simply a different interpretation of the moment at which a copyright is con-
sidered “registered” such that a plaintiff may file suit, there is no practical 
distinction as to which approach better serves the goal of formality.89 Con-
gressional intent to retain formality in United States copyright law is not 
affected by adoption of either approach, which the Eleventh Circuit should 
have considered in its analysis.90 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. of Appeals for Eleventh Circuit erred in its approach to inter-
preting § 411 of the Copyright Act of 1976 when it held that the statute is 
unambiguous and consequently engaged in no further policy consideration. 
The Copyright Act continued the American tradition of formality in copy-
right law, but it also relaxed a significant amount of those formalities for the 
benefit of functionality. Section 411, which both requires registration for 
suit and permits protection for intellectual property before registration, is 
emblematic of that balance.  
Conflicts within the law are often visualized as a balance scale, where 
two conflicting arguments must be assessed until the more meritorious ar-
gument outweighs the lesser. For this circuit split, however, this kind of bi-
nary assessment is not necessary. Most arguments purported by pro-
registration circuits regard benefits and incentives which apply equally to 
the application approach. The strengths of the registration argument not 
                                                                                                                           
requirement for foreign works but leaving in place the registration requirement for domestic 
works, in part to preserve the Library of Congress’ ability to receive significant works registered 
by the Copyright Office. Id. at 1206; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 107, 150, as reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5722, 5766. The Tenth Circuit discusses this rejection in the context of 
Congress’s decision to retain the registration requirement, framing it as supportive of a registration 
approach. See La Resolana, 416 F.3d at 1205–06. The support for this argument is unclear; there 
is no discussion of why drawing the line of registration at the point of application disincentivizes 
copyright holders from filing their copyrights. See id. at 1206. 
 88 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–412 (establishing protection and eliminating mandatory regis-
tration); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 107, 150, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5763 (blan-
keting protection to copyrights published even without notice for the full statutory period). H.R. 
REP. NO. 94-1476 at 107, 150, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5770 (discussing the 
Register’s flexibility in what constitutes an appropriate deposit of materials for registration). 
 89 Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612 at 619. 
 90 Compare Fourth Estate II, 856 F.3d at 1342 (considering the formality requirement met 
when the plaintiff had filed the application and the Office of the Register has analyzed the work), 
with Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d 612 at 619 (considering the formality requirement met when the 
Office of the Register has received formal application, deposit, and filing fee of the work at issue). 
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shared by the application approach are rooted in arbitrary statutory interpre-
tation, which are shaky at best, and cherry-picking at worst. Allowing a 
copyright to be registered for litigation purposes at the time of application 
makes functional sense and protects litigants from the disadvantages of a 
registration approach without in turn disadvantaging defendants. 
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